Quine and Ullian, background and C1, C2

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Background
A number of issues have led to some sophistication in our view of scientific knowledge. These include, but are not limited to:

• Logical Positivism and its collapse; related questions about the foundations of science.
• Quine-Duhem Thesis
• Quine's denial of analyticity

The Web of Belief, C1

• This book is in many ways just a sophisticated critical thinking text -- however, it is informed by Quine's philosophy and can act as a springboard for discussion of complex issues in the a science-informed epistemology.
• Quine and Ullian see science as a general and systematic attention to experience -- they will explain in the remainder of the book what the systematic requirements are.
• Contrary to scientific reasoning is a widespread embracing of superstition and unscientific claims. Examples include astrology. This gives some urgency to the project of encouraging scientific reasoning.

The Web of Belief, C2

• They describe the problem as one of fixing beliefs, and of resolving conflicts of beliefs. They are interested in those things that we believe are true ("...believe true...").
• Belief is understood as a disposition to assent to certain claims, and perhaps to undertake other kinds of actions.
• They understand belief as a relation of thinkers to sentences, and will worry no more about the philosophical issues that this can raise.
• Disbelief is not the same as non-belief. Disbelief about sentence P is the belief that P is not true; non-belief about P is to not believe P (one might have no opinion about whether P is true or false, for example).
• Knowing is not the same as belief; knowing that P is at least to believe that P when P is true.
• Evidence for a belief must not be confused with the cause of a belief.
• We seem to be epistemic conservatives: we tend to keep believing opinions that go unchallenged and that do not obviously contradict other opinions we hold.
• Beliefs tend to come and fall in groups: several beliefs may support or justify each other.
• We consider and weigh a collection of beliefs when an inconsistency appears, and should do so at least until we are satisfied that the conflict is resolved.
• NOTE: contrary to a foundationalist view of justification of beliefs, Quine and Ullian are leaning in some ways towards the alternative known as coherentism, in which beliefs are (at least in part) justified by being consistent with each other, and perhaps also if they entail each other.