Begins by pointing out the
problem with verificationism: if
we rule that all speech is true or false or nonsense, we call "nonsense" much
of our speech which is clearly meaningful
In other words, there are
different uses of language than just making declarative statements.
(Austin does warn that we
should not think that there are infinitely many uses of language, but certainly
more than just declarations.)
Austin focuses (in this
article) on examples of speech that look like declarative speech but which are
not true or false
Wedding "I do"
An apology: "I apologize"
Christening: "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth"
Bet: "I bet you sixpence it will rain
tomorrow."
He calls these "performative
utterances."
These utterances are not best
understood as signs of internal intents, but have a social role independently
of that (I can make a promise without good will and still be held to it).
These performative utterances
are not true or false, but do have correctness conditions that they have to succeed
at meeting.
Conditions include:
1. Some relevant convention must exist and be
accepted. (E.g., there must be a
convention of weddings.)
2. The circumstances to invoke the convention must be
appropriate. (E.g., one must get
married in particular ways.)
Sometimes the utterance must be sincere (E.g., one does not congratulate insincerely). But this is not a condition of success so much as an expectation....
Are
these two conditions sufficient?
Austin argues they are not.
Example: we have a convention for naming a ship,
and we have a ceremony to name it, but then someone rushes up and names it
something unexpected.
Example: I could misunderstand your promise or
bet or whatever.
The
two conditions are necessary but not sufficient: much more needs to be explained.
Can
we distinguish performative from declarative utterances in a regular way?
One
criterion might be first person singular verb use: "I do," "I
promise..."
But
there are also cases like "You are hereby warned..." and so on.
Can
we distinguish performative verbs ("promise," etc.)?
Yes,
and they may perform a necessary role in performative utterances, but they do
not delimit performative utterances.
Problem: the distinction between performative
and declarative speech is not clear or simple.
For
example, declarative speech seems to also have correctness conditions (other
than being true or false).
For
example, it seems wrong to say
"P is true but I don't
believe that P."
"All of John's children
are bald and John does not have any children."