Think of such an act as being
like a move in chess.
However, natural language may
be full of exceptions (and so not at all like chess in this regard).
Still, Searle sides with
Austin and against Wittgenstein, arguing that there are clear uses of language
and these are finite in number.
Clarity about what we are doing will reveal this.
Classifying illocutionary
acts, we get a few basic kinds of acts (which can be combined):
We tell people how
things are
We try to get people to
do things
We commit ourselves to
doing things
We express our feelings
and attitudes
We bring about changes
(through the utterances).
Example of necessary and
sufficient conditions for promising:
S makes a promise T to the
person H iff
1. Normal input-output conditions obtain
2. S expresses some proposition p in T
3. In expressing that p, S predicates a future act A of
S.
4. H would prefer that S do A instead of not do A, and S
believes that H would prefer this.
5. It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A.
6. S intends to do A.
7. S intends that T will put S under obligation to do A.
8. S intends that H know that T is to count as obligating
S to do A.
9. Semantic rules of both S and H are such that only if
1-8 obtain is there a promise.
Searle recombines these into:
Propositional
content rule: The promise is uttered only in context of a sentence T
which predicates some act A of S.
Preparatory
rules: The promise is uttered only if H would prefer S's
doing A and S believes H would prefer this; and if it is not obvious that S
will do A.
Sincerity
rule: The promise is uttered only if S intends to do A.
Essential
rule: The promise counts as undertaking an obligation to do A.
Searle uses this as an example, and then extends this over into a preliminary analysis of other illocutionary acts.
Some open questions:
Searle's list looks
pretty exhaustive - is Wittgenstein wrong that there are unlimited variations?
Does (should?) Searle
give us reason to believe that declarative statements and illocutionary acts
are very clearly distinct? Should
we have Austin's worry?
What kind of meaning
theory would well fit with what Searle is proposing?