PHL323. Some thoughts on Genetic Drift and Selection.
Some thoughts on Genetic Drift and Selection
We've been discussing the question of how we can distinguish
genetic drift from selection. Part of this has been our discussion
of Beatty's very interesting paper.
Beatty argues only that the role of probability and randomness in
evolution (or in evolutionary theory) is less clear than we might at
first think. I would like to go farther. I think there are at least
two genuinely philosophical problems we might find, when we consider
the kind of cases he describes, or that we discussed together in class.
(1) The first problem is, when is something an adaptation, and when is
it not an adaptation?
We want to reason something like this (I'll adopt genocentric
terminology, but we could run the argument the same way with
some other kind of trait identified):
- There came to be a preponderance of gene g in the population
to which the ancestors of organism o belong.
- If over time there came to be a preponderance of gene g in
the population to which the ancestors of o belong, then gene g
provided a selection benefit to ancestors of o
- If gene g provided a selection benefit to ancestors of o,
then gene g of organism o is an adaptation for o.
- By steps 1 and 2, we conclude that gene g
provided a selection benefit to ancestors of o.
- By steps 3 and 4, we conclude that gene g of organism o is
an adaptation for o.
That's crude, in part because I wanted to shoehorn the argument into
propositional logic, but it's not far off the mark. Now, the problem
is with premise 2. As we noted, there could be cases where a
preponderance of gene g in the population to which the ancestors of o
belong arises because of an event like a lightening strike. Thus, if
some trait becomes prevalent because an individual with an alternate
trait is struck by lightening, we will say its preponderance is an
adaptation.
There is no contradiction here. We could simply say that the trait is
an adaptation. But if we make that move, then there is no difference
between an adaptation and random genetic drift.
The question is: is there such a difference? And, if so, how can
we make sense of it?
You raised in class some suggestions. For example, some of us
proposed that we could say that the gene g was irrelevant to
lightening strikes, as was the competing allele to g (say, g*) which
lightening kicked out of the gene pool. But now note: with an
explanation like that, we've added something very strong to our
account. We've added something like an assessment of what a gene
is good for, what it could do, and thus of what is and is not relevant
to questions of it being an adaptation.
The same would seem to be true of the statistical outs we might
pursue. If we say, gene g* would have been most prevalent if the
population were infinitely large, the natural question is: why is
that? (Another question is: how would we know? But I'm interested in
the metaphysical, not the epistemic, question here.) It would seem we
should answer this question with an account of what gene g* and gene g
can do, what they're good for, and so on, and why neither would help
regarding lightening strikes but one might be helpful regarding some
more prevalent environmental challenges, and so on. And, again, that
refers to something like a functional description of g and g*, and not
just to their prevalence in the population.
(2) The second problem is, can we make sense of something
having a function in terms of it being selected?
We'll talk more about this notion of purpose or function later. But,
briefly, many philosophers hope that we can say that the purpose of
the heart is to pump blood; and what this means is that the heart was
selected for pumping blood (that's too quick, but it conveys the
idea).
You can see immediately our problem. Again being very rough, our
problem is something like this; we want to make the following kind of
argument. Assume that gene g causes events of kinds {
e1...em...en } in the organisms of
in the population O that have the gene; let o be one of the
organisms of kind O.
- The ancestors of the organism o had gene g and g caused
events of kind em and because of these events these
ancestors had more progeny than other organisms in the population
with alternative genes (alleles).
- The purpose of gene g in organism o is to cause events of
kind em if the ancestors of the organism o had gene g
and g caused events of kind em and because of these
events these ancestors had more progeny than other organisms in
the population with alternative genes (alleles).
- Therefore, the purpose of gene g in organism o is to cause
events of kind em.
So, the idea is, if there were a gene for having a heart (this, again,
is simplistic), that gene would cause many kinds of events, including
for example making the noise of a heartbeat. But pumping blood is
the purpose of the heart because that provided a selection benefit.
But how do we cash out the "because" in premise 1? That's actually
very tricky, since it seems to require us to see what the benefit of
the gene is, independent of whether it was selected or not. But, an
ideally quick and least costly answer would be: variations of gene g
that did not cause that kind of event became less prevalent in the
population (there is the problem that there may not be such variations
of g, but setting that aside...). That is, the most parsimonious
explanation would get rid of the "because" by saying that this is
simply the thing that happened, in distinction from various
alternatives.
But if there is genetic drift, we cannot make this move. We cannot
assume that because a gene is present it provided a selection benefit.
In that case, it really does look like there is not much hope in
cashing out our talk about functions by this kind of account of
inherited functions, without having some robust theory of why a trait
is beneficial, and what about the trait is not beneficial,
independent of what actually became more prevalent in the
population (or, as we might say, independent of what was
"selected"). And that would seem to put us right back at square one
when we try to explain what we mean by biological function.
[2/26/2012]