| Theory Description | Simplistic Example of an Identity Claim | Example Philosopher | Note
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Interactive Substance Dualism
| Mind and body (extended stuff) are two different kinds of
substances that do interact casually. Substances are kinds of
beings that can exist without other kinds. For Descartes,
there can be minds without bodies, and bodies without minds.
| (Mental event m is a different type of thing than is any
physical event p, and vice versa; thus:)
Mental kind pain for x = some specific kind of mental event
in mind of x which is not any physical event and could in
principle exist without any physical event.
| Descartes
| Substance dualism without interactivism includes parallelism
(the two substances act in ways that, typically through the grace
of god, are miraculously seemingly interacting).
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Philosophical Behaviorism
| Mental state terms and descriptions are translatable
without significant loss of utility into some behavioral state
terms or descriptions. (One might say, minds are behaviors,
but some philosophical behaviorists believe we should avoid
talking as if there is a thing, mind.)
| pain for x = the increased likelihood of x
to withdraw, to say "ouch," to undergo certain autonomic
changes, etc.
Applied to belief: it's hard to say something general about
belief accounts as a whole, but a specific case might allow an
illustration of the idea applied to belief. Thus:
belief by x that there is food in the refrigerator = the
increased likelihood of x to open the refrigerator when looking for
food or when hungry, to say "the refrigerator" when asked
"where's the food?", etc.
| Ryle
| Philosophical behaviorism is distinct from psychological
behaviorism both by the linkage with a focus on language, and
also a presupposition that (almost) all our mental state talk
can be saved and translated into behavioral talk.
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Psychological Behaviorism
| Some of what we call mental events are predispositions to
kinds of behavior in response to kinds of stimuli; some of
these dispositions are learned through conditioning. Or: some
mental terms and descriptions are translatable to some
behavioral event terms or descriptions.
| pain for x = the increased likelihood of x
to withdraw, to say "ouch," to undergo certain autonomic
changes, etc.
| Watson, Skinner
| The feature that distinguishes psychological from
philosophical behaviorism is both an openness to the idea that
we might introduce new mental or behavioral terms; or revise
some of those that we have; and that we may eliminate some of
our mental terms as unsalveagable; and an occasional
willingness (in practice, but not in their descriptions of
their own method) to allow for some internal mental events or
capabilities. Also, as a practical matter, psychologists were
concerned with method and not ontology.
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Type Identity Theory
| Some mental kinds are physical kinds
| mental event kind pain = physical event kind of such
and such neurons firing. (Here, the physical event is
left even more vague because we don't have yet much idea about
how to do such a reduction.)
| Smart, Place
| Types may be of varying specificity. Some might for
example think that there are physical types across species for
a mental type like pain (e.g., all animal pains are the same
kind of mental event, and identical to the same kind of brain
event). Others might construe the kind more narrowly; e.g.,
supposing that a kind like pain is specific to, say, a
species, so that human pain would be identical only to a
physical kind found in humans.
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Proper Token Identity Theory
| Some mental events are physical events (but for some of these
mental events there is no kind that is also a physical kind)
| mental event instance pain of x = physical
event instance such and such neurons firing in x.
(Here again I made up and left vague a physical event. The
important thing is that each instance is reducible, but --
in the case of what I'm calling "proper" token identity theory
-- the kind is not.)
| Davidson
| Note that type identity theory would entail token
identity; so, when a theory is called a "token identity theory"
it is typically assumed that it is not a type identity theory.
Token identity theory typically depends upon some notion of
multiple realizability.
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Functionalism
| Some mental events are physical events, which can be
identified by the functional role they play in a functional
system.
| pain of organism x = physical event (probably a brain
event) that plays such and such a functional role in leading
the organism to be more likely to withdraw, to say "ouch," to
have certain autonomic changes, etc.
(We would ultimately describe the functional role in terms of
the relation of this physical event to other physical events
that have also their own functional roles; functions are
products of a network of such relations.)
belief that P for organism x = physical event that
plays such and such a functional role in leading the
organism to be more likely to assent to P, etc., and
having relationships to other functional
events of a kind that reflect the semantic relationships
between P and those events.
This last example is more of a punt, but the idea is that the
relation between P and other propositions would be reflected
in the functional organization. For example, if you believe
that P-->Q and you believe that P you are inclined to believe
Q, and so on.
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| The important difference from behaviorism, which must be
stressed, is that there is an event which is causing the
relevant behavior, which has the relevant relationships. In
behaviorism, the behaviors stand alone and we posit no such
event. It is debatable, and depends on details, whether
functionalism is a token or type identity theory. The
functional events referred to are types, but whether
those functional types need to be physical types is debated (I
think they must be, but not all agree here). The primary
inspiration for this view is the computer; software events are
excellent examples of functional events.
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Eliminativism
| Some mental state terms do not properly refer to anything. They
are superstitions, like ascribing an illness to demon possession.
| [For example, assuming eliminativism about belief] There is no
thing x such that x = belief that P.
| Rorty and Churchland on some propositional attitudes,
some psychological behaviorists for some mental state terms
| Restriction of the domain to be eliminated is carefully
done by eliminativists. It would be a parody to say they
eliminate the mind.
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