

Locke's Inverted Spectra

Neither would it carry any Imputation of *Falshood* to our simple *Ideas*, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That *the same Object should produce in several Men's Minds different Ideas* at the same time; *v.g.* if the *Idea*, that a *Violet* produced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a *Marigold* produces in another Man's, and *vice versa*. For since this could never be known: because one Man's Mind could not pass into another Man's Body, to perceive, what Appearances were produced by those Organs; neither the *Ideas* hereby, nor the Names, would be at all confounded, or any *Falshood* be in either. For all Things, that had the Texture of a *Violet*, producing constantly the *Idea*, which he called *Blue*, and those which had the Texture of a *Marigold*, producing constantly the *Idea*, which he as constantly called *Yellow*, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions, marked by the Names *Blue* and *Yellow*, as if the Appearances, or *Ideas* in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly the same, with the *Ideas* in other Men's Minds. (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1689, II, xxxii, 15)

Four Anti-Physicalist Arguments

1. The Modal Argument
2. The Knowledge Argument
3. The Zombie Argument
4. The Superfunctionality Claim
5. (The Explanatory Gap Argument)

2. The Knowledge Argument

1. Mary knows all relevant physical facts about red experience before and at time T.
2. Mary sees red for the first time at time T.
3. Mary learns something new about red experience at time T.
4. If Mary learns something new about red experience at time T, then Mary did not know everything about red experience before time T.
5. Mary did not know everything about red experience before time T. (Modus ponens, 3, 4.)
6. If Mary did not know everything about red experience before time T, then not all knowledge about red experience is knowledge of physical facts. (This is inferred from 1, universal instantiation, and modus tollens with 5.)
7. Not all knowledge about red experience is knowledge of physical facts. (Modus ponens, 5, 6.)
8. If physicalism about consciousness is true, then all knowledge about red experience is knowledge of physical facts.
9. Physicalism about consciousness is false. (Modus tollens, 7, 8.)

3. The Zombie Argument

1. Zombies are conceivable.
2. If Zombies are conceivable, then zombies are possible.
3. If zombies are possible, then physicalism about consciousness is false.
4. Physicalism about consciousness is false.
(Modus ponens 1, 2; modus ponens 3.)

The Superfunctionality Claim

What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes *beyond* problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience -- perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report -- a further unanswered question may remain: *why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?* (Chalmers 2010: 8)

4. A version of an argument using the Superfunctionality Claim

1. If a phenomenon can be explained by science, then that phenomenon is a relationship.*
2. Phenomenal experiences are not relationships; they are atoms of experience.**
3. Phenomenal experiences cannot be explained by science. (Universal derivation; universal instantiation 1; modus tollens 2.)

* This view was once called “structuralism.”

**This is what I call “the superfunctionality claim”: that experiences are not functional relations, but atoms that have intrinsic properties independent of their relations.

5. The Explanatory Gap “Argument”

1. Subject S occupies brain state B.
2. Occupying brain state B is to experience a reddish experience.
3. S is experiencing a reddish experience.

Levine’s Claim: This argument has the same form as other scientific reductions. BUT, this argument does not tell us what it is like to have a reddish experience. There is a gap between scientific explanation and what we want to have explained.

Theories of consciousness?

- Dual aspect theory (e.g. Chalmers). The world is made out of information. Seen from one perspective, we can well but incompletely describe the world with physical sciences. Seen from another perspectives, we ca well but incompletely describe the world as consciousness experiences.
- Neutral monism.
- Panpsychism.
- The Representational Theory of Consciousness (often combined with Global Workspace Theory).
- The Enactivist Theory of Consciousness (arguably this is a specific form of representational theory of consciousness).
- Eliminativism.

Representational Theory

- Each conscious experience is a mental representation. (This is an identity claim!)
- The character of the experience is determined by the “content” (semantics, meaning) of the representation. (So the “content” of a red representation differs from the “content” of a blue experience, and this is what distinguishes their phenomenal character.)
- “Content” is a bit unclear, but since many people are convinced that our brains have representations, and that these representations have content (meaning), this is not a *new* problem.

Enactivist Theory

- Each conscious experience is a perception.
- The phenomenal character of the perception is determined by the sensorimotor expectations of the agent and the sensorimotor character of the thing perceived.
- Inverted spectra are impossible, on this view.
- Zombies are impossible—if an organism has the right sensorimotor expectations and understanding, it has the perception and so the whole phenomenal experience.