

Just saying....

- “Externalism” is a bad name!
- “Extendism” or “extensionism” would be better.
- The claim is not that a cognitive event can be external, in the frequent sense of “external” to mean completely outside.
- The claim is that a cognitive event can extend from the body.
- So: Otto’s belief exists in a system that includes **both** his body and the book

The Parity Principle

Suppose:

If an event (functionally very similar to) *E* were to happen in the head, then we would call it a mental event or cognitive event;

And suppose:

Event *E* extends beyond the body (it includes both the body and some features of the environment);

Then:

E is a mental event.

C&C also suggest some necessary criteria for extended cognition

- Reliable
- Readily available
- Endorsed (and previously endorsed)

An argument

- If Otto & the notebook's joint determination that the MOMA is on 53rd arose from abilities solely in Otto's head, then we would call it a mental event (namely, memory).
- Otto & the notebook's joint determination that the MOMA is on 53rd is an event that is part of a system that includes and extends beyond the body.
- (Simplified Parity Principle:) If any event is such that if it occurred in the head we would call it a mental event, and if that event is part of a system including and extending beyond the body, then that event is a mental event.
- **Therefore:** Otto & the notebook's joint determination that the MOMA is on 53rd is a mental event (namely, memory).

On a physicalist-functionalist theory of a mental event kind m...

m = one or more kinds of events that we identify by their functional role* in the mind, and this functional role relates (certain kinds of) input to (certain kinds of) output.

*This functional role may require that we posit a purpose or goal to the relevant system.

Externalism seems to be a consequence of a liberal reading of physicalist-functionalism

- If we identify the events or structures of a mental event very loosely (for example, if we care mostly about the input and output, and less about the details between these), then externalism seems to follow.
- What reasons might we have to identify the events or structures of a mental event more strictly (so that, as a result, we care less about the input and output, and more about the details between these)?

Non-derived content

- **Adams & Aizawa:** non-derived content is a mental event that has meaning and does not get its meaning from social convention.
- **Better:** non-derived content is a mental event that has meaning and the mental event does not require interpretation by an agent in order to have that meaning.

Examples

- Non-derived content:
 - Tom thinking, “Two is greater than one.”
 - Ivan thinking, “I should go.”
- Derived content:
 - The words in any book
 - A green traffic light